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Abstract
Small-scale human societies range from foraging bands with a strong egalitarian ethos to more
economically stratified agrarian and pastoral societies. We explain this variation in inequality using
a dynamic model in which a population’s long-run steady-state level of inequality depends on the
extent to which its most important forms of wealth are transmitted within families across generations.
We estimate the degree of intergenerational transmission of three different types of wealth (material,
embodied, and relational) as well as the extent of wealth inequality in 21 historical and contemporary
populations. We show that intergenerational transmission of wealth and wealth inequality are
substantial among pastoral and small-scale agricultural societies (on a par with or even exceeding
the most unequal modern industrial economies) and quite limited among horticultural and foraging
peoples (equivalent to the most egalitarian of modern industrial populations). Differences in the
technology by which a people derive their livelihood and in the institutions and norms making up
the economic system jointly contribute to this pattern.
Investigations of the dynamics of economic inequality across distinct economic systems have
been limited by the paucity of data on all but contemporary market-based industrial societies.
They are also hampered by the lack of an empirically-based model applicable to the differing
institutions and technologies characteristic of the broad range of economic systems, ranging
from hunter-gatherers through pastoral and agrarian societies to modern economies. Here we
present empirical estimates of the extent of inheritance of wealth across generations and of the
degree of wealth inequality, along with a descriptive model of the relationship between the
two. We support our model with data on three distinct wealth classes – material, embodied and
relational, to be defined below – in 21 contemporary and recent hunter-gatherer, horticultural,
pastoral and agricultural populations.
The key thesis to be explored is that for some kinds of wealth and some economic systems (but
not others) the parents’ wealth strongly predicts the wealth of the offspring. In particular, the
cattle, land and other types of material wealth of pastoral and agricultural economies are
directly transmitted by simple transfers, often buttressed by social conventions of inheritance.
By contrast the somatic wealth and skills and the social network ties central to foraging and
horticultural livelihoods are more subject to the vagaries of learning, genetic recombination,
and childhood development. Moreover, in foraging and horticultural economies, such material
wealth as exists tends to circulate through broad social networks rather than being vertically
transmitted to offspring. A corollary of the thesis is that, if our model is correct, economies in
which material wealth is important will show substantial levels of wealth inequality.
Both the thesis and the corollary find strong support in our data. We focus on small-scale
societies because they offer the greatest variation in both the technologies by which a livelihood
is gained and the basic institutions that provide the incentives and constraints regulating
economic life, including the dynamics of inequality and the inheritance process. (We use the
term “small-scale” to refer to populations in which the influence of modern national states is
limited). These societies thus provide the most powerful lens for exploring hypotheses
concerning the importance of technologies (kinds of wealth) and institutions (kinds of society)
in explaining the dynamics of inequality, and thus may also illuminate long term trends in
contemporary and future economies.
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The connection of wealth inheritance to wealth inequality (explained more precisely in the
model below) is the following. If wealth is strongly transmitted across generations, chance
shocks to the economic fortunes of a household due to disease or accident, luck in a hunt or
harvest, and other environmental disturbances or windfalls will be reproduced in the next
generation. These effects will thus accumulate over time, and thereby counteract the widely-
observed inequality-dampening tendency of regression to the mean (1–3). We seek to
understand the effects of this process by examining how the offsetting effects of random shocks
and imperfect transmission across generations jointly determine a steady-state distribution of
wealth for differing kinds of wealth and across the four different economic systems. The
institutions and norms that characterize distinct economic systems and the nature of the wealth
class alike will affect the degree of intergenerational transmission. The extent of shocks will
also differ across wealth classes and economic systems.
For a number of modern economies there are quantitative estimates and comparisons of the
intergenerational transmission of education, occupational prestige, non-human physical capital
and other forms of embodied and material wealth (3–5). For small-scale populations,
relationships among reproductive success and material forms of wealth have been studied
(6), and there exist piecemeal estimates of intergenerational transmission of, for example,
fertility (7) and height (8). But there are no estimates allowing a comparison across populations
of the inheritance of the distinctive kinds of wealth that are central to the livelihoods of small-
scale communities of foragers, horticulturalists, herders and farmers. Here we present a new
set of data and conduct a quantitative comparative analysis of the transmission of distinct types
of wealth among the 21 populations shown in Figure 1 and Table 1. Further information is
provided in (9).
The dynamics of wealth inequality
To clarify our model, we initially consider just a single type of wealth and show that the degree
of inequality in its steady-state distribution depends on the extent to which wealth is transmitted
across generations. Suppose that a household’s wealth is acquired in two ways. The first is
transmission directly from the parents, in the form of material bequests, labor, skills, private
information, genotype, conditions affecting development, network connections, and so on. The
second way of acquiring wealth is from the resources available to all members of the
population, in the form, say, of equal access to common resources or public information.
We summarize the parental and non-parental influences on a household’s wealth by expressing
the expected wealth of household i as βwip + (1−β)w, where wealth is measured in natural
logarithms, wip is the wealth level of household i’s parents and w is the population-average
wealth level (normalized to be the same across generations). The intergenerational transmission
coefficient, β (0 ≤ β < 1), measures the extent to which the wealth of a household in one
generation depends on the wealth in the previous generation, and (1−β) represents regression
to the mean as introduced by Galton in his study of human stature (10).
In each generation, the realized wealth of a household is its expected wealth (above) plus a
disturbance term, λ, reflecting exogenous shocks that over time are assumed to be independent
of the wealth of previous generations, with mean zero and variance σλ2:
(1)
We are interested in the variance of the logarithm of a population’s wealth (a standard unit-
free measure of inequality) in the long run. To determine this, we use equation (1) to write the
variance of wealth in generation t as:
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(2)
where μt−1 is the variance of log wealth in the parental generation. We then solve for μ, the
steady-state (stationary, or long run) variance of log wealth, by setting μt−1 = μt =μ giving:
(3)
The steady-state level of wealth inequality may be interpreted as the effect of stochastic shocks
(the numerator), blown up by the intergenerational transmission multiplier, (1−β2)−1, which is
increasing in β, the extent of intergenerational transmission of wealth. As β approaches one,
the effects of windfalls of wealth, accidents of health, theft, and the like, dissipate more slowly
over time so that the shocks of even the distant past contribute to inequality in a given
generation, resulting in high levels of steady-state inequality. For β exceeding one there is no
steady state and inequality will increase over time. Figure 2 shows the determination of steady-
state inequality by equations (2) and (3).
A population exposed to greater wealth shocks is represented by a larger intercept on the
vertical axis (σλ2) while greater intergenerational transmission of wealth is represented by a
steeper solid line (the slope of which is β2, see equation 2). To use this model we need not
assume that the steady-state wealth distribution is typically attained. What is important for our
approach is that for a given society the fluctuations around the steady-state value are small and
random relative to the differences in steady state inequality across societies characterized by
different economic systems and different kinds of wealth.
By a household’s wealth we mean any of its attributes that contribute to its well-being as
measured by consumption levels, social status, or other ends that are valued in the particular
society. To take account of many kinds of wealth simultaneously we define the importance of
each class of wealth as follows. Let E, M, and R be positive numbers representing the amount
of a household’s embodied, material and relational wealth. The well-being of the household,
W, is a weighted product of these classes of wealth, the weights being the relative importance
of each wealth class in the economic system in which the household lives:
(4)
where γ is a positive constant and the exponents e, m, and r (the weights) are the derivatives
of the logarithm of well-being with respect to the logarithms of the three respective wealth
classes, or equivalently the percent difference in well-being associated with a one percent
difference in the amount of each class of wealth. The weighted product is preferred (to the
weighted sum, for example) because it implies, plausibly, that the wealth classes are
complements, that is, the contribution of each class of wealth to individual well-being is
enhanced by the extent of the other classes of wealth.
We assume constant returns to scale (doubling the amount of all three classes of wealth of a
household will double its well-being) implying that e + m + r = 1. This motivates our
interpretation of these exponents as weights indicating the relative importance of each class of
wealth. We refer to these weights as α = {e, m, r}. To combine this information on the
importance of wealth classes with our measures of the extent of transmission of each wealth
class across generations, we estimate an α-weighted average β for each economic system. We
also calculate an α-weighted average measure of wealth inequality (the Gini coefficient) for
each economic system (see below).
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Ideally one would have comparable measures of the relative importance (α) and degree of
transmission of each class of wealth (β), the degree of inequality in the distribution of each
kind of wealth (Gini), and the extent of wealth shocks (σλ2). Measuring the latter is difficult
in any economy and impossible in the economies under study, as the estimate requires long
time-series data for individual wealth, which with few exceptions are simply non-existent. We
are able, however, to measure the other three quantities, and this permits us to gauge the extent
to which intergenerational wealth transmission allows the effect of shocks to accumulate over
time, and to explore differences in both intergenerational wealth transmission and wealth
inequality across economic systems and wealth classes.
The nature of wealth and the varieties of economic systems
Since the development of human capital theory a half-century ago, it has been conventional to
treat wealth as a multi-dimensional attribute, as evidenced by the adjectives now routinely
applied to the word “capital,” namely, social, somatic, material, cultural and network (11–
13). We identified three broad classes of wealth in our populations, namely, embodied (body
weight, grip strength, practical skills, and in pre-demographic transition populations,
reproductive success), material (land, livestock and household goods), and relational (social
ties in food-sharing networks and other forms of assistance). We have no measures of other
heritable determinants of well-being such as ritual knowledge, an important source of
institutionalized inequality in some populations. By linking the level of wealth of parents and
adult offspring, measured as appropriate for individuals (e.g. body weight) or households (e.g.
land), we are able to estimate the degree of intergenerational persistence for particular types
of wealth, and then to create averages for each broad class of wealth.
We classify economic systems according to the conventions of anthropology (14). Hunter-
gatherer economic systems are those that make minimal use of domesticated species (either
plant or animal), whereas pastoralists rely heavily though rarely exclusively on livestock kept
for subsistence and sometimes commercial purposes. While both horticulturalists and
agriculturalists use domesticated plants and animals, horticulturalists do not typically use
ploughs, their cultivation is labor- not land-limited, and land markets are absent or limited. As
with all classificatory systems there are some ambiguities of assignment of our populations to
these classes, but the least improbable reclassifications do not affect our results (see (9), section
4).
Transmission of wealth across generations need not take the form of bequests, or the literal
passing on of physical objects (such as when land is transmitted from father to son). What
matters for the long-run dynamics of inequality is anything that results in a statistical
association between the wealth of parents and children. This statistical association may be
enhanced by positive assortment in mating or in economic pursuits as occurs when skilled
hunters pursue prey together, or when successful herders cooperate in livestock management.
The same is true of increasing returns or other forms of positive feedbacks, for example when
those who invest a substantial amount earn higher than average returns, or when childhood
developmental effects associated with modest genotypic differences result in substantial
phenotypic differences. Negative feedbacks such as sharing norms that extract substantial
transfers from the wealthy, or wealth shocks that are inversely correlated with one’s wealth
(such as occur when cattle thieves target large herds), by contrast, heighten regression to the
mean by reducing β, thereby attenuating the persistence of inequality over time and hence
reducing steady-state inequality.
Our three wealth classes differ in the extent to which these transmission mechanisms –
transfers, assortment, and positive feedbacks in development or accumulation – are at work.
Material wealth is readily transferred to the next generation by bequests sanctioned by cultural
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rules. Moreover, because it is typically observable, material wealth can facilitate deliberate
marital or economic assortment. For some types of material wealth (storage facilities, defense
of herds, and irrigated land, for example) the correlation of material wealth levels across
generations is further enhanced by the presence of increasing returns to scale or other positive
feedbacks. Network ties can easily be passed from parent to child, but the offspring of less
well-connected parents can usually gain access to allies and helpers more readily than a landless
son in a farming community can acquire land, for example through savings or systems of
patronage. As a result we expect the intergenerational transmission of relational wealth to be
quite limited, at least by comparison with material wealth.
Embodied wealth is transmitted by a combination of genetic inheritance, deliberate
socialization, and parent-offspring similarity in the conditions affecting childhood
development. The knowledge component of embodied wealth is readily transmitted to
offspring, but unless restricted by religious or other constraints it is typically available to other
members of a population as well (the common knowledge of the behavior of prey species, for
example, or farming practices). Genetic and psychometric evidence from industrial societies
suggests that parent-offspring transmission of economically relevant personality and
behavioral characteristics such as risk-taking, trustworthiness, conscientiousness, and
extroversion is quite limited (9). We do not have similar evidence across generations in the
small-scale populations under study, but industrial-society estimates support our expectation
that the degree of intergenerational transmission will differ markedly among our three wealth
classes, with substantial transmission of material wealth and more limited transmission of
relational and embodied wealth.
Ethnographic evidence suggests that the four economic systems also differ in the importance
of the three classes of wealth. A successful hunter-gatherer or horticulturalist depends heavily
on his or her strength, practical knowledge and social networks while making little use of
material resources that are not in the public domain. By contrast the well-being of a herder or
farmer is closely tied to the amount of stock or land under his or her command, making material
wealth a more important influence on livelihoods in these economic systems.
Estimating the intergenerational transmission of wealth
To estimate our model of wealth transmission we need two pieces of information: the degree
of intergenerational transmission (β) for each wealth type, and the importance of each wealth
class in a given economic system (α ≡ {e, m, r}). Note that we do not require identification of
the causal paths by which transmission takes place, as might be represented in a multi-equation
structural model (15). Our model instead requires a single estimate of the magnitude of the
statistical association between parental and offspring wealth (β) for each data set. This
requirement, along with the absence of robust evidence of non-linearities, motivated our
consistent use of linear models. Functional forms, estimation procedures, robustness checks,
weighting procedures and other aspects of our statistical techniques and results are described
in (9), section 1. Note that the populations studied were not selected at random; instead, we
included all populations we were aware of for which intergenerational wealth transmission
estimates are feasible and the researchers agreed to share data.
Table 1 presents our individual estimates of β while Table 2, below, presents the summary
statistics for both the intergenerational transmission (β) and the importance of the three wealth
classes in the four economic systems (α).
Across the four economic systems, the estimated β for 14 measures of material wealth,
including agricultural and horticultural land, livestock, shares in sea-mammal-hunting boats,
quality of housing and household utensils averages 0.37 (Table 2). For farm land (5 data points)
the degree of transmission is substantial, averaging 0.45 (calculated from the data in Table 1),
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thus equaling or exceeding the intergenerational transmission of most forms of wealth in
modern industrial economies (16). Livestock are even more highly transmitted across
generations (Table 1, βs averaging 0.66).
Our 23 estimates of the transmission of embodied wealth across generations average 0.12. The
highest estimates are for body weight (for which β averages 0.37). We also find a very modest
level of intergenerational transmission of reproductive success (RS or number of offspring
surviving to age 5); it is entirely absent in three societies, has a maximum value of 0.21, and
averages 0.09, similar to low correlations between parental and offspring fertility in many pre-
demographic transition populations (17). Grip strength shows low transmissibility across
generations. The transmission of hunting success is highly variable (0.08 for the Ache, 0.38
for the horticultural Tsimane, and 0.05 for hunting and foraging yields in the Hadza), averaging
0.17. Knowledge and skill, such as the production and management of horticultural crops in
the Pimbwe or proficiency in subsistence tasks and cultural knowledge in the Tsimane, are
only weakly transmitted from parents to offspring.
The six estimates of relational wealth transmission indicate that while network links are
transmitted across generations, the extent is modest, averaging β = 0.19.
To measure the importance of each wealth class in the four economic systems (α) we used
ethnographers’ judgments (for each wealth class in the population they studied) of the
percentage difference in household well-being associated with a one percent difference in the
amount of a given wealth class, holding other wealth classes constant at the average for that
population, and requiring these percentage effects to sum to one. The average values of α by
wealth class and economic system also appear in Table 2. Consistent with descriptive
ethnographies of these and other populations, embodied and relational wealth are relatively
important for hunter-gatherers while material wealth is key in pastoral and agricultural
populations.
Statistical estimates of the importance of each class of wealth across the economic systems
(α) would have been preferable, but are precluded by the absence for most populations of a
single relatively homogeneous measure of well-being. However we were able to
econometrically estimate m – the importance of material wealth – from an equation similar to
(4) using data (most of it from half a century ago) from populations not represented in our
study, including one horticultural, two pastoral and seven small-scale agricultural economies.
These estimates (see (9) section 1) are close to our ethnographers’ estimates, and suggest that,
if anything, we have understated the difference in the importance of material wealth between
pastoral and agricultural economies, on the one hand, and horticultural economies on the other.
Correcting this understatement would only strengthen our main conclusions.
Results
Our first finding is that the α-weighted averages of the βs (the importance-weighted average
transmission coefficients) for the four economic systems differ markedly (Table 2).
Intergenerational transmission of wealth is modest in hunter-gatherer and horticultural systems
and quite substantial in agricultural and pastoral systems. However, even the smaller βs of the
former imply that being born into the top ten percent of the wealth distribution confers quite
significant advantages. In these societies, a child of parents in the highest wealth decile is on
average more than three times as likely to end up in the top decile as is the child of the bottom
decile ((9), section 3 and Table S7). While hardly a level playing field, intergenerational
transmission in these economic systems is modest when compared to the agricultural systems,
where the child of the top decile is on average about 11 times more likely than the child of the
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poorest decile to end up in the richest decile, or to the pastoral systems, where the ratio exceeds
20.
Our second finding is that economic systems in which wealth is more heritable are indeed more
unequal, as predicted by our model. For each population and type of wealth we estimated the
Gini coefficient, which is a measure of inequality ranging from 0 (equal wealth) to
approximately 1 (all wealth held by a single household, see Table S4 and discussion in (9),
section 1). To calculate an overall measure of wealth inequality for a given economic system
we again weight the results for each wealth class in that system by its importance (α). These
estimates of overall wealth inequality appear in the last column of Table 2, and in more detail
in Table S5. They exhibit the same pattern as the transmission coefficients (βs): hunter-gatherer
and horticultural populations are both quite egalitarian, while pastoral and agricultural societies
are characterized by substantial wealth inequality (see also Figure S2).
A third finding is that neither the overall intergenerational transmission of wealth nor the level
of inequality is greater in horticultural than in hunter-gatherer populations. This result
challenges a long-standing view (18) that foragers are uniquely egalitarian among human
societies. Thus it may be ownership rights in land and livestock, rather than the use of
domesticated plants and animals per se, that are key to sustaining high levels of inequality.
Our finding that pastoralists transmit wealth across generations to an extent equal to if not
greater than farmers, and likewise display similar Gini coefficients, will also challenge widely-
held views that herders are relatively egalitarian (19).
Is the relative intergenerational mobility of the hunter-gatherer and horticultural systems and
the high levels of intergenerational wealth transmission of the pastoral and agricultural systems
due primarily to technology (the differing importance of the distinct classes of wealth across
economic systems) or to institutions (differences in intergenerational transmission,
independent of differences in the importance of the wealth classes)? To answer this question,
we take advantage of the fact that both the importance of the wealth classes and degree of
intergenerational transmission of wealth are similar in the hunter-gatherer and horticultural
populations, on the one hand, and the pastoral and agricultural populations on the other. This
allows us to reduce the four systems to two. Forty-five percent of the large (namely 0.21) and
statistically significant difference (p<0.001) between the average α-weighted βs of these two
groups of economic systems is accounted for by differences in technology, reflected primarily
in the greater importance of material wealth in producing the herders’ and farmers’ livelihoods
(for the decomposition formula, see (9) section 1; for the paired economic systems results, see
Table S3). The remaining 55 percent is due to differences in institutions, reflected primarily
in the lesser degree of transmission of material wealth in the horticultural and hunter-gather
populations. While differences across economic systems in both the importance of the wealth
classes and in the heritability of a given class of wealth are relevant, the latter are somewhat
more strongly associated with differences in the extent of wealth transmission across
generations, and hence the generation of inequality. This is our fourth finding.
Note that for the intergenerational transmission of wealth, the effects of technology and
institutions are complementary rather than simply additive. Econometric analysis (Table S13,
equation 2) shows that this joint (super-additive) effect of material wealth and agricultural or
pastoral economic systems in the intergenerational transmission of wealth is statistically robust
even when using a fixed-effects regression to control for all unobserved population-level
characteristics (such as the distinct inheritance and marital systems and other institutional
structures of the populations).
Not surprisingly in light of our fourth finding, additional econometric analysis (described in
section 5 of (9)) shows that both wealth class and economic system significantly and
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independently predict the level of wealth inequality: material wealth types, and pastoral and
agricultural societies, display higher Gini coefficients (Table S13, equation 3). Moreover, the
greater inequality in material wealth is robust to the inclusion of fixed effects to control for
unobservable population-level variation (Table S13, equation 4).
A final finding is that, in the populations studied, the more important forms of wealth are more
highly transmitted across generations: the simple correlation between the 43 βs listed in Table
1 and the corresponding population and wealth-class specific αs listed in Table S1 is 0.48
(p=0.001). This is consistent with the view that the extent of transmission of a given type of
wealth is affected by individual decisions, and that parents differentially transmit to their
offspring the forms of wealth that are most important in that society (20). This is most striking
in the case of material wealth. In pastoral and agricultural societies its average importance
(α) is 0.60 and the average transmission coefficient (β) is 0.61, while in hunter-gatherer and
horticultural populations the values respectively are 0.18 and 0.13 (calculated from Table 2,
see Tables S2 and S4). Similarly, the less important forms of wealth in agricultural and pastoral
systems (embodied and relational wealth) display significantly lower βs.
We implemented two robustness checks to make sure, first, that our results are not driven
merely by the qualitative estimates of α provided by the ethnographers and, second, that these
estimates are themselves plausible. The first is the above decomposition of the effects of
economic system and wealth class, which shows that a substantial difference (more than half
of that estimated) between economic systems in aggregate wealth transmission across
generations would exist even under the unrealistic assumption that the importance of the wealth
classes does not differ across economic systems. The second check is provided by our
econometric estimates of the importance of material wealth mentioned above. Note that
differences between the estimates of the importance of the two non-material types of wealth
(e and r) are modest, and that e + m + r = 1, so we may group embodied and relational wealth,
whose importance we measure by 1− m*, where m* is the average of our econometrically
estimated coefficients for material wealth in pastoral (0.84), agricultural (0.57) and
horticultural (0.23) production. (We use the latter figure also for hunter-gatherers and in light
of their evident similarity with horticulturalists.) Using these weights rather than those
estimated by the ethnographers gives results similar to Table 2 ((9) section 5), but with even
greater differences in the intergenerational transmission of wealth between the agricultural and
pastoral economies, on the one hand, and the hunter-gatherer and horticultural economies, on
the other.
Discussion
Our principal conclusion is that there exist substantial differences among economic systems
in the intergenerational transmission of wealth, and that these arise because material wealth is
more important in agricultural and pastoral societies, and because in these systems material
wealth is substantially more heritable than embodied and relational wealth. By way of
comparison, the degree of intergenerational transmission of wealth in hunter-gatherer and
horticultural populations is comparable to the intergenerational transmission of earnings in the
Nordic social democratic countries (4) – the average β for earnings in Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway is 0.18 – while the agricultural and pastoral societies in our data set are comparable
to economies in which inequalities are inherited most strongly across generations, the U.S. and
Italy, where the average β for earnings is 0.43 Concerning wealth inequality, the Gini measure
in the hunter-gatherer and horticultural populations is almost exactly the average of the Gini
measure of disposable income for Denmark, Norway and Finland (0.24) while the pastoral and
agricultural populations are substantially more unequal than the most unequal of the high
income nations, the U.S., whose Gini coefficient is 0.37 (21).
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Our model explains some seeming anomalies, such as substantial wealth differences in those
hunter-gatherer populations whose rich fishing sites can be defended by families or other
corporate groups and transmitted across generations, and which constitute an atypically
important form of material wealth for those societies (22). Our findings also provide evidence
for the view – widely held among historians, archaeologists and other social scientists – that
some influences on inequality are not captured simply by differences in technology, as
measured by our αs. For example, the marked hierarchies among some Australian foragers
may be due to polygyny (23), elite possession of ritual knowledge (24) that may be transmitted
intergenerationally, or even to the dynamics of food sharing (25). Similarly, the fact that some
agricultural and pastoral societies do not exhibit substantial levels of economic inequality
despite their characteristic forms of wealth being in principle heritable (26,27) suggests the
importance of deliberate egalitarianism, and other cultural influences and political choices
(28). Examples include the lavish funeral feasting that redistributes the wealth of the elite
among the Tandroy and other cattle pastoralists in Madagascar (29) and elsewhere (26). Other
examples are the Nordic social democratic polities mentioned above.
One may speculate on the basis of these results that the current trend towards a knowledge-
based economy that is less reliant on material wealth and more reliant on embodied and
relational wealth might in the long run be associated with a concomitant reduction in
intergenerational wealth transmission. But the importance in our data set of economic systems
per se as a determinant of the dynamics of inequality suggests that the implications for
inequality of this shift in how humans make a living will depend critically on our institutions.
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Figure 1. Populations studied
Note: Circle indicates hunter-gatherers, star horticulturalists; square pastoralists, and triangle
agriculturalists.
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Figure 2. Steady-state wealth distribution
The dashed line is the steady-state condition requiring wealth inequality to be unchanging from
one period to the next. The solid line (equation 2) is the combined effect of this period’s variance
of shocks (the constant) augmented by the inequalities in wealth transmitted from the previous
period (the slope).
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 (9
), 
se
ct
io
n 
1,
 fo
r a
 d
is
cu
ss
io
n 
of
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 to
es
tim
at
in
g 
th
es
e c
el
l-m
ea
ns
 an
d 
th
ei
r s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
, a
nd
 T
ab
le
s S
11
 an
d 
S1
2 
fo
r t
he
 al
te
rn
at
iv
e r
es
ul
ts
. R
ep
or
te
d 
P-
va
lu
es
 co
rr
es
po
nd
 to
 tw
o-
ta
ile
d 
te
st
s o
f t
he
 h
yp
ot
he
si
s t
ha
t t
he
 tr
ue
 β o
r G
in
i c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
is
 z
er
o 
fo
r t
ha
t c
el
l. 
A
ve
ra
ge
s a
cr
os
s w
ea
lth
 c
la
ss
es
 (f
in
al
 tw
o 
co
lu
m
ns
) a
re
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
af
te
r w
ei
gh
tin
g 
th
e 
ce
ll-
m
ea
n 
βs
 a
nd
 G
in
is
 b
y 
th
e 
va
lu
es
 o
f α
 sh
ow
n.
† T
he
 e
la
st
ic
ity
 a
nd
 G
in
i f
or
 K
ip
si
gi
s c
at
tle
 p
ar
tn
er
s (
se
e 
Ta
bl
es
 1
 a
nd
 S
4)
 a
re
 u
se
d 
in
 th
e 
Pa
st
or
al
/R
el
at
io
na
l c
el
l f
or
 th
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
α-w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
ac
ro
ss
 w
ea
lth
 c
la
ss
es
.
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